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Abstract
This paper examines why Latinos, over the past thirty years, are consistently more trusting of
the federal government than are Anglos and Blacks. We address this puzzle by turning to previous
research on racial politics and political trust. Consistent with previous research, discrimination and
generational status are important predictors of Latinos’ levels of political trust, with first generation
Latinos more trusting than later generation Latinos. Encounters with racial discrimination also
make Latinos and Blacks less trusting of government. In contrast, Anglos’ levels of political trust
can be explained by their economic evaluations as well as their partisanship. While these findings are
insightful, they do not directly address why inter-group differences arise when it comes to their trust
in government. We argue that, combined with generational distinctions amongst Latinos in their
levels of trust, the heavy flow of Latino immigration in the past thirty years has changed the Latino
population in such a way that the views of the foreign-born are disproportionately represented in
survey questions related to trust in government. This is producing a Latino population that is more
inclined to trust government than Anglos or Blacks. We then examine the impact of political trust
on individuals’ opinions towards redistributive policies. Political trust has a strong and positive
effect on Latinos’ attitudes towards such policies. These findings have important implications for
the future of public opinion and redistributive policy-making in the U.S.
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1 Introduction
Over the past 35 years, many scholars have been concerned about a noticeable decline in the trust
that Americans have in their government, a decline starting during the 1960’s. The amount of trust
one places in government also influences an individual’s political attitudes and opinions (Baldassare
2004; Hetherington 1998, 1999, 2005). Yet what if Latinos, the fastest growing segment of the
U.S. population, projected to make-up over a quarter of the population in less than twenty years,
consistently possess higher rates of political trust than non-Latino Americans? What implications
might this have on the landscape of American public opinion and political behavior? Interestingly
enough, this is not a mere thought exercise, but an empirical puzzle of contemporary importance.
We motivate our study by looking first at the responses provided by Anglo, Black, and Latino
respondents from the National Election Studies (NES) from 1964-2002, with respect to their trust
in the federal government.1 Here we look at the standard question used to study political trust,
which asks survey respondents whether they trust the people in Washington to do what is right.
We graph in Figure 1 the responses to this question, using data from the NES, for White, Black and
Latino NES respondents.2 Prior to 1972, the NES categorized Hispanic and Latino respondents
into a residual (“other”) category, so in Figure 1 we use the responses of all those classified as
“other” before 1972 while after that we are able to more specifically use only the responses of those
who were classified as only Hispanic or Latino.
[Figure 1 Goes Here]
This simple graph shows a number of interesting phenomenon. The primary result, which
motivates our interest in this topic, is the observation that with only a few exceptions, the trust of
Latino respondents in government is greater than that of both Anglo and Black respondents. While
the changes over this span of data in the time-series for each racial/ethnic group are correlated, it is
11964 is the first year in which the NES included this trust question.
2Sapiro, Virginia, Steven J. Rosenstone, and the National Election Studies. AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION
STUDIES CUMULATIVE DATA FILE, 1948-2002 [Computer file]. 12th ICPSR version. Ann Arbor, MI: University
of Michigan, Center for Political Studies [producer], 2004. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political
and Social Research [distributor], 2004.
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also the case that Latinos are generally more trusting of government than respondents from other
racial/ethnic groups. Secondly, and worth separate discussion, is the fact that Latino respondents
are generally more trusting than Black respondents — which we return to below, as it provides
us an important opportunity to contrast the political experiences of Latino and Blacks regarding
their orientation to American politics during this period. Third, we also note that examination
of this data provided in Figure 1 shows that it is unclear that the dynamics of political trust —
for Anglos, Blacks or Latinos — yields readily to the sort of analyses that have been staple in the
political trust literature. As we discuss below, most of the previous research on political trust has
focused attention on the decline in political trust through the early 1980’s; note that this graph
indicates that the decline was reversed in the mid-1990’s for all three racial/ethnic groups, and at
least through 2002 political trust has been on the increase in the United States in the NES data.
The primary focus of this paper is to understand the political trust of Latinos, as compared to
Anglos and Blacks. Drawing on the racial politics literature, where the bulk of the work focuses on
the Black-White dichotomy, we might expect Latinos to possess levels of political trust comparable
to Blacks; their status as racial minorities in America and the structural and political inequalities
that follow, resulted in more cynical and pessimistic views toward government (Hero 1992). How-
ever, given the unique historical experience of Black Americans, a history in which Latinos do not
share, this framework may not entirely explain why differences like those apparent in Figure 1 exist
(Dawson 1994). The few empirical studies conducted in the political science literature find that
immigrants who have not fully assimilated into American society are more trusting of government
than those who are more assimilated in the American political system (Michelson 2001, 2003).
Immigrants who are new to the American political system may not only perceive it as being better
than their homeland government, but also give credence to the “American dream” and everything
associated with this idea — freedom, democracy, and transparency. The provision of public goods
may also serve as clear and positive signals to immigrants. As such, we would expect foreign-born
immigrants to posses more optimistic and positive views of government than would later generation
immigrants.
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Race scholars have also found experiences with racial discrimination to affect immigrants’ po-
litical attitudes and behaviors (Michelson 2001, Michelson 2003, Portes and Rumbaut 1996, Garcia
Bedolla 2005, Pantoja et al 2001). The selective disassociation or downward assimilation theory
(Portes and Rumbaut 1996) suggests that immigrants who have experienced racial/ethnic discrim-
ination in either their personal or daily lives are less likely to assimilate at rates comparable to
immigrants with no experiences of racial/ethnic discrimination. Thus, we might expect immigrants
who report being discriminated against due to their ethnicity to be less politically trustful than
those with no experiences of discrimination. Such encounters may lead second- and later-generation
Latinos to possess more pessimistic and negative views of American society and government, which
in turn may lead to a dislike for big government, and government involvement in general (Garcia
Bedolla 2005). But even if later generations do not experience discrimination, their longer presence
in America (relative to their parents) may cause them to assimilate or acculturate into all aspects
of American society; thereby adopting a more cynical and distrustful view of government. These
theories, however, cannot fully explain the pattern for Latinos’ rates of trust depicted in Figure 1.
If Latinos were indeed assimilating at normal or predicted rates, then their levels of political trust
should be similar to the levels of political trust for Anglos and Blacks. While these assimilation
theories can explain the differences in levels of political trust within the Latino community, they
cannot explain why Latinos are more trusting of government than are Anglos and Blacks.
We offer two reasons as to why Latinos’ levels of political trust have been greater than Anglos
and Blacks for the past thirty years. First, as the racial politics literature suggests, first generation
immigrants tend to possess more optimistic and favorable views of the government than later gen-
eration immigrants. Thus when asked how much they trust the federal government, immigrants
may be more positive and optimistic than non-immigrants. The second reason relates to immi-
gration trends in the U.S. Focusing on approximately the same time period as the one for trust
(1964-2000), the proportion of the Latino population that is foreign-born has continually increased.
In 1970, only 19.9% of the Latino population was foreign-born, but by 2000, almost half (45.5%) of
the Latino population in the U.S. was foreign-born.3 Therefore, along with generational differences
3These figures are from the “Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-born Population of the United States:
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in immigrants’ levels of political trust, the steady influx of foreign-born Latinos explain why, over
time, Latinos have been more politically trusting than Anglos and Blacks.
Our first step at explaining these variations in political trust is to examine the determinants
of trust in government for Latinos, Blacks and Anglos. We contend that even if assimilation or
selective disassociation theory can explain Latinos’ attitudes towards the government, we would
still expect Latinos to be more politically trusting than Blacks or Anglos as a result of the steady
rates of Latino immigration in the past thirty years. We then go on to explore how political trust
influences individuals’ attitudes towards policies that the government is directly responsible for
(e.g. redistributive policies). We predict that Latinos’ high levels of trust in government will make
them more supportive of these policies than non-Latinos. The following section reviews previous
research on political trust and political assimilation. We then discuss our research design and
methods, followed by a section that presents our findings. We conclude by discussing the policy
implications from our research, in particular, the future of public support for redistributive policies
in the U.S.
2 Political Trust in America
Levi and Stoker broadly define trust as a relationship that “involves an individual making herself
vulnerable to another individual, group or institution that has the capacity to do her harm or
betray her (2000, 476).” Political trust or trust in government, however, does not equate to the
same type of trust that one might bestow upon a friend. Instead, one’s trust in government may
suggest a belief that the government or elected official possesses the ability to perform a good job
(Hardin 2002). It can also be conceived of as a one-way form of trust, since it is the individual who
trusts the political institution, with no expectations that the institution will reciprocate (Hardin
2002). Over the early span of the time-series data on political trust, we see that political trust hit
its peak in 1964, followed by an overall decline. Scholars attribute this downward trend to events
such as Vietnam, Watergate and the Civil Rights Movement (Markus 1979, Abramson 1983). But
1850-1990” by Campbell J. Gibson and Emily Lennon, Population Division, U.S. Bureau of the Census.
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even when the administrations responsible for these events changed, this decline still continued.
As a result, scholars pointed to the growing cynicism of television news reporting as the reason for
these decreasing levels of trust (Patterson 1994, Chan 1997). The electorate’s negative evaluations
of Congress, and by default, the national government, further contributed to this downward trend
in political trust (Williams 1985, Feldman 1983).
Concern about the decline in political trust results from the belief that trust is intricately
linked to political behavior. The conventional wisdom is that individuals who are more trusting
should also be more likely to participate and to be involved in politics (Stokes 1962, Almond and
Verba 1963). According to Putnam (2000), individuals who trust in their fellow citizens should be
more willing to meet and interact with others than those with lower levels of trust. Those with
high levels of trust should also be the ones that volunteer, participate in political events, and in
general, be the most civically engaged. Despite the logic of this argument, little empirical support
exists for the relationship between trust and participation. Rosenstone and Hanson (1993) find no
difference in the likelihood of voting and levels of political interest amongst the most and the least
trusting individuals. Miller (1974) reaches a similar conclusion, failing to observe a relationship in
the decreasing turnout rates and low levels of government trust. However, Shingles (1981) finds that
politically distrustful individuals participate in more policy-related politics than more politically
trusting individuals.
Instead of focusing exclusively on the relationship between trust and political participation,
Hetherington (2005) examines the importance of political trust in one’s support for policies where
risk or sacrifice on the part of the individual is involved, e.g. redistributive policies. Thus, political
trust is a crucial determinant of public opinion when it pertains to policies that only benefit a small
group in society (e.g. racial minorities, the poor). Anglo parents’ support of affirmative action
policies in the university admissions process provide a good test of Hetherington’s argument. He
finds that a parent’s support for affirmative action is contingent on his/her level of political trust,
since one has to have enough faith in the federal government’s ability to implement these policies
in an impartial and race-neutral manner. The importance of political trust, however, diminishes
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when it pertains to one’s attitudes on policies that require little personal sacrifice or risk, such as
social security and crime prevention. The implications of Hetherington’s findings for our research
question are timely and important. In approximately twenty years, the American public will largely
be comprised of individuals who could directly benefit from redistributive policies, the reasons for
which are discussed in the next section. Latinos are expected to make-up 25% of the U.S. population
by 2025 (US Census Bureau 2002). If the trend presented in Figure 1 holds, where Latinos are more
trusting of government than Anglos and Blacks, the overall public’s attitudes towards redistributive
policies may begin to gradually shift over the next two decades, as such policies would directly
benefit a sizable portion of the U.S. population.
Turning to the factors that influence an individual’s trust in government, one’s political views
and perceptions are more strongly associated with his/her level of political trust than socioeconomic
status and demographic attributes ( Stokes 1962, Craig 1996, Citrin and Muste 1999, Hetherington
2005). An individual’s partisanship, economic evaluations, policy satisfaction and retrospective
assessments of the incumbent are the primary political factors that influence trust in government
(Miller 1974, Citrin and Green 1986). The critical role of the media (Patterson 1993) personal
qualities of the president (Citrin and Green 1986), times of war (Parker 1989), and major political
scandals (Weatherford 1984) have also been found to influence an individual’s trust in government.
Several studies have found differences in the levels of political trust between racial minorities
and non-minorities, specifically between Blacks and Whites. For instance, Blacks are less trusting of
the government than Anglos when it pertains to government’s efforts at racial equality (Abramson
1983). Moreover, Shingles finds that political trust and efficacy play an important role in the
participation rates of Blacks, though it depends on the particular policy issue. But why Blacks are
less politically trusting than Latinos, as the trends from the NES data suggest, has not received
much attention in the research literature. One reason may be that Blacks hold a more pessimistic
outlook on the future of race relations as well as their future than Latinos, Whites and Asians
(Hajnal and Baldassare 2001). Blacks are also the least satisfied of their job opportunities and
local government efforts in the employment sector, when compared to the other three racial groups
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(Hajnal and Baldassare 2001). Given that race relations, civil rights, and employment are so closely
linked with the actions of the federal government, this may help to explain why Blacks’ levels of
political trust are lower than those of Latinos.
While these research findings are important, they suffer from the conceptualization of race as
a purely black-white dichotomy.4 As such, our knowledge of Latinos’ attitudes towards government
is quite limited. A local study conducted by Michelson (2001) finds that recent Puerto Rican im-
migrants in the Chicago area are more trusting of the government than are long-time Puerto Rican
residents. Her research on Mexican Americans produce similar results, where the greater one’s level
of acculturation into American society, the lower their level of government trust (Michelson 2003).
Moreover, a 2001 Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) survey of California residents finds
that American-born Latinos are less trusting of government than naturalized Latinos, a pattern
that is consistent with the assimilation theory (Hajnal and Baldassare 2001). However, this survey
finds that Latinos, overall, are more trusting of government than Blacks and Anglos. A similar
pattern exists in the Latino National Political Survey (LNPS); while 25% of the foreign-born Latino
respondents always trust government to do what is right, only 7.3% of the American-born Latinos
always trust government (de la Garza and DeSipio 1992). Unfortunately, these studies, and the
data they are based upon, are limited by an insufficiently small sample of Blacks and Latinos for
detailed comparative study. Others are limited by geographic constraints or by exclusively focusing
on the Latino population, without comparing them to other racial or ethnic groups. Our analysis
uses data from national surveys, with large samples of Anglos, Blacks and Latinos, so that we can
statistically compare political trust across the three racial/ethnic groups.
3 Assimilation, Discrimination, and Immigration Trends
We argue that generational differences amongst Latinos, along with U.S. immigration trends, ex-
plain why they are more trusting of government than non-Latinos. Typically, the immigrant ex-
perience is described in terms of the classic political assimilation model, which focuses on socioe-
4The extremely limited number of Latinos interviewed in the NES could also be another potential reason.
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conomic factors as the primary determinant of political assimilation (Dahl 1961, Wolfinger 1974).
This model associates increased levels of socioeconomic well-being with ones rate of integration into
the political system. Based on this model, Latinos, over time, should grow to be more politically
cynical and skeptical of the federal government, as these are the views held by most Americans.
But when Latinos first arrive to the U.S., they may possess high levels of political trust for a num-
ber of reasons. As discussed earlier, the majority of immigrants from Latin America and Mexico
immigrate to the U.S. for economic reasons (Portes and Rumbaut 1996), knowing full-well both the
economic and quality of life opportunities available to them in America relative to their homeland.
This optimistic outlook should go hand in hand with their beliefs about the American government,
therefore causing first generation immigrants to hold the American government in high regard.
A more recent assimilation perspective argues that traditional conceptualizations of assimila-
tion, such as an improvement in language skills and familiarity with cultural norms and customs,
do not necessarily result in actual political assimilation (Greeley 1971; Glazer and Moynihan 1970;
and Portes and Rumbaut 1996). Portes and Rumbaut (1996) refine these concepts in the creation
of the segmented assimilation theory, where experiences of discrimination serve to reemphasize the
distinctive nature of the ethnic group, and perpetuate ethnic patterns and customs. Empirical
support for the segmented assimilation theory exists; Mexicans with higher socioeconomic status,
longer residency in America, and encounters with discrimination in America, are less likely to
assimilate (Hero 1992). Moreover, Garcia Bedolla (2005) finds that participation in electoral pol-
itics and trust in government decline by one’s generational status. While first-generation Latinos
strongly believe that the government should solve community problems like crime, education, and
after school programs, later-generation Latinos view their own community as the primary way to
resolve their issues and concerns. In fact, the most acculturated Latinos (third-generation or later),
feel that the government could not be expected to solve the problems of Latinos. Such attitudes
are formed, in part, as a result of their experiences with discrimination and their perceptions of
the federal government’s willingness to help their community (Garcia Bedolla 2005). Therefore,
consistent with the assimilation theory, we expect Latinos who experience discrimination to be less
trusting of government than those with no experiences of discrimination.
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These theories of assimilation need to be considered in light of American immigration trends
over the past 30 years. As Figure 2 demonstrates, the percentage of immigrants originating from
Latin America has gradually increased from 1970-2000. This means that the foreign-born (or first
generation) segment of the Latino population is constantly being replenished. While less than 20%
of the Latino population in 1970 were foreign-born, there has been a steady increase through 2000
— in 2000, the foreign-born component of the Latino population is over 45%.5
[Figure 2 Goes Here]
If foreign-born Latinos are more trusting than later generation Latinos, then over time we
would expect a larger and larger share of the Latino population to view the American government
in a positive manner. This explanation would be consistent with the pattern that emerges from
the NES data, presented in Figure 1. These foreign-born Latinos may have also had little to no
experiences with discrimination, as this generally does not occur until the second generation (Portes
and Rumbaut 1996). But even if Latinos experienced discrimination, the constant influx of new
Latino immigrants would dominate opinions from later-generation Latinos in surveys. As such,
analysis of Latino public opinion might predominantly come to reflect the views of the foreign-born
population. The following section outlines our research design, followed by a discussion of the
results emerging from our analysis.
4 Hypotheses and Research Design
We seek to address two questions. First, we are interested in understanding the determinants of
political trust for Anglos, Blacks and Latinos. By doing so, we can explain why inter-group differ-
ences exist in their levels of political trust. We go on to examine whether political trust explains
Latinos’ policy attitudes, and in particular, their opinions on redistributive policies. Based on the
segmented assimilation model, we expect individuals who have experienced racial discrimination to
hold less favorable views of the government, relative to those with no experiences of discrimination.
5These figures are from the “Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-born Population of the United States:
1850-1990” by Campbell J. Gibson and Emily Lennon, Population Division, U.S. Bureau of the Census.
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We also predict that, for Latinos, their generational status will influence their views towards gov-
ernment; later-generation Latinos, particularly those with the longest presence in America, should
be less politically trusting than first-generation Latinos. In terms of the relationship between po-
litical trust and policy attitudes, we expect political trust to positively influence Latinos’ attitudes
towards redistributive policies. In our analysis, we use two different sources of data to test these
two hypotheses.
First, we test the hypotheses pertaining to the determinants of political trust primarily using
data from the 2002 Pew Hispanic Center and the Kaiser Family Foundation National Survey of
Latinos. This telephone survey took place from April 4 to June 11, 2002, and is comprised of a
nationally representative sample of randomly-selected individuals 18 years and older. Altogether,
more than 2,900 Latinos (comprised of individuals from Mexico, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Central
and South America) are interviewed, as well 1,284 non-Latinos. The survey includes the most
general question pertaining to political trust; it asks respondents how much they “trust the gov-
ernment in Washington to do what is right”. The possible responses are just about always, most
of the time, some of the time, and never. This measure of trust serves as our dependent variable,
and given its ordinal nature, we use ordered logit analysis.
The independent variables used in this analysis control for the respondent’s demographics,
political beliefs, and economic evaluations. More specifically, one’s marital status, partisanship,
education and income level, gender and age are accounted for. We code marital status as a dummy
variable, with a “1” indicating that the respondent is married, 0 otherwise. One’s gender is coded
in the same manner, where a “1” indicates that the respondent is a woman, 0 for male. Age is
treated as a continuous variable, ranging from young to old. We create three dummy variables
for low, medium and high income, with high income being the omitted category. We also create
three dichotomous variables capturing the respondent’s level of education: no high school degree,
high school degree and some college or beyond. The latter category serves as the baseline. In
light of previous research finding that one’s political views, especially those of the current admin-
istration, influences their trust in government (Craig 1996, Citrin and Muste 1999), we control for
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a respondent’s economic evaluations by using a question asking them about their pocketbook fi-
nances. Respondents were asked whether their current financial situation, compared to a year ago,
was better, the same or worse. Each of the responses are coded as dummy variables, with those
responding that their financial situation was worse being the omitted category. We also control
for a respondent’s experience with racial discrimination within the past five years to account for
the segmented assimilation model. In addition, we account for instances when a respondent faced
workplace discrimination (e.g. promotion or hiring) because of their ethnic or racial background.
Encounters with discrimination, especially of the job-related kind, may cause Latinos and Blacks
to be less trusting of the government in general when compared to those who have not experienced
any racial discrimination, since they may feel that government efforts to resolve this problem have
been ineffective.
Finally, for Latino respondents, we control for their generational status. One’s nativity is
determined by their parents’ birthplace, along with their own place of birth. Latinos who are not
born in the U.S. are considered to be first-generation, and those who are born in the U.S. but whose
parents are born elsewhere are referred to as second-generation. Third-generation Latinos are those
born in the U.S. as well as their parents. Those possessing fourth-generation status indicate that
they, their parents as well as their grandparents are U.S. born. We generate four dummy variables
to capture generational status, with the baseline category being first-generation respondents. In
order to compare the effect of the independent variables on political trust for each ethnic/racial
group, we estimated this model separately on Latinos, Anglos and Blacks.6
We then estimate a model that examines the impact of political trust on Latinos’ attitudes
toward redistributive policies, since we are interested in the potential implications that Latinos’
high levels of political trust may have on the future American political landscape. Focusing redis-
tributive policies allows us to test Hetherington’s (2005) central findings that political trust plays
an important role when it pertains to policies that the government is responsible for, and also those
6We also ran a pooled model interacting each of the independent variables with the respondent’s ethnicity (Anglo
and Latino). A Chow-test of this pooled model yielded an F test statistic of 15.25, which is statistically significant a
the p < .01 level.
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where the benefit goes to a specific group. However, for this test, we use data from the National
Annenberg Election Survey (NAES 2004), which interviewed a sizable number of Latinos and non-
Latinos prior to the 2004 general election (Romer et al. 2006).7 While the survey did not include
a specific question pertaining to welfare, several redistributive questions are available. These ques-
tions focused on a respondent’s support/opposition to: 1) “the federal government trying to reduce
the income differences between rich and poor Americans”; 2) “the federal government giving tax
credits or vouchers to help parents send their children to private schools”; 3) “providing financial
assistance to public elementary and secondary schools - should the federal government spend more
on it, the same as now, less, or no money at all?”; 4) “providing health insurance for people who
do not already have it– should the federal government spend more on it, the same as now, less, or
no money at all?” Individuals’ responses to the first two questions ranged from strongly oppose,
somewhat oppose, neither favor or oppose, somewhat favor, and strongly favor. For these two
questions, we create dummy variables, with a “1” indicating those who oppose the policy and “0”
for those who are in support of the policy. The third and fourth questions offered respondents with
four choices (more, the same, less or none). We again create dummy variables with a “1” indicate
those who favor less or no federal spending, and a “0” for those who favor either the same or more
spending by the federal government. These four questions serve as the dependent variables of our
model and we estimate each using logit analysis.
Clearly, the first question most directly captures an individual’s attitudes towards redistribu-
tive policies and it also requires a large amount of sacrifice on the part of the individual, as those
who would reap the benefits are concentrated to a few. The remaining three questions are also re-
distributive in nature, though the amount of sacrifice is less, since more individuals would reap the
benefits from such policies. There is little doubt that a large percentage of Latinos would benefit
from these redistributive efforts. Slightly more than twenty-two percent of Latinos currently live
7The NAES was conducted by Daniel Romer, Kate Kenski, Kenneth Winneg, Christopher Adasiewicz, and Kath-
leen Hall Jamieson of the Annenberg Public Policy center of the University of Pennsylvania. While using the National
Election Survey would allow us to compare our results more directly with Hetherington’s, very few Latinos are in-
terviewed each year. For instance, 89 respondents were interviewed who were of Hispanic/Latino descent in 2002.
In 2000, the number interviewed was only slightly higher at 113. From 1972-2002, a total of 1,399 Latinos were
interviewed by the NES.
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in poverty, while 32.7% lack health insurance (U.S. Census Bureau 2002).8 A greater amount of
federal funding towards public education as well as school tax credits/vouchers would also assist
Latinos, given that the gap in per pupil funding between minority and white school districts is
more than $1,000 (Carey 2003); thus a greater amount of federal assistance could improve the
schools Latino students attend or they could turn to tax credits/vouchers as alternatives to public
education. Based on Hetherington’s argument, we expect Latinos’ high levels of political trust,
along with the fact that they would be the main beneficiaries from these redistributive policies to
make them more supportive of these policies than non-Latinos.
Our main independent variable of interest in this analysis is political trust, which is coded
as a categorical variable ranging from never to always trusting the government in Washington to
do what is right. To determine whether a Latino’s high levels of trust influences his/her attitudes
towards redistributive policies, we include an interaction term for a Latino respondent and his/her
level of political trust. We also control for a respondent’s demographics and political attitudes. Of
course, one’s political affiliation may impact their views on these policies; thus we create dummy
variables indicating a respondent’s partisanship as Republican, Democrat or Independent, with
those responding as Independents being the comparison group. We also account for a respondent’s
ideology, ranging from very conservative to very liberal. Along with these political variables, a
respondent’s socioeconomic status may influence their attitudes towards redistribution. We include
several dummy variables to indicate a respondent’s educational level and their income category.9
Age and gender are also controlled for, with age being a continuous variable and gender coded
as a “1” for female, “0” for male. Finally, we account for a respondent’s economic evaluations, as
these could potentially influence their support or opposition to redistributive policies (Hetherington
2005).
8http://www.cbpp.org/8-29-06health.htm
9These variables were coded in the same manner as the previous model.
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5 Findings
We present our analyses in the following order. First, we examine how political trust varies with
ethnicity, and for Latinos, how it varies across generational status, using both the 2002 Pew and
2004 NAES surveys. We follow this simple presentation of the data with our multivariate models
that test for both hypotheses. The first set of analyses examines the determinants of political
trust for Anglo, Black and Latino respondents; we follow that analysis and discussion with our
multivariate analysis of the factors influencing Latinos’ redistributive policy attitudes.
5.1 Political Trust by Race, Ethnicity, and Generational Status
Table 1 gives a snapshot of respondents’ attitudes towards government, by their ethnicity and
generational status in 2002, using the Pew Hispanic Survey data; Table 2 presents respondents’
trust in government and and elected officials in 2004, using the NAES data. Consistent with the
temporal pattern depicted in Figure 2, a greater percentage of Latinos always trust government to
do what is right, relative to the other ethnic/racial groups in both 2002 and 2004. Likewise, the
percentage of Latinos in 2002 who never trust government to do what is right is smaller than the
percentage for White, Black, Asian and “other race” respondents (3.2% versus 3.4%, 7.3%, 5.8%,
8.7%, respectively). As a point of comparison, the other large immigrant population in the U.S.,
Asian Americans, are not as politically distrustful as Blacks, but are more distrusting than Latinos
in 2002; 5.8% of Asians never trust government to do what is right, compared with 3.2% for Latinos
and 7.3% for Blacks. Additionally, when we examine the other two questions on government’s role in
society, we again see that Latinos are more trusting and supportive of government than members
of any other racial or ethnic group: 68.4% of Latinos stated that they prefer more taxes and a
bigger government, and 59.9% stated that a bigger government is better for the provision of public
services. The 2004 Annenberg survey also includes a question pertaining to an individual’s trust in
the honesty of elected officials. As the distribution from Table 2 demonstrates, Hispanics and Asians
are more trusting of the honesty of their elected officials than Whites and Blacks. Consistent with
their levels of trust in government, we see that Blacks are the least trusting of politicians (15.9%),
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when compared to the other three racial groups.
[Tables 1- 3 Go Here]
By comparing the rates of political trust for the three dominant racial groups in the U.S. using
both the 2002 Pew and the 2004 NAES data, we see again that Latinos are the most politically
trusting, followed by Asians and Blacks. While one may have expected Asian Americans to follow
the same trajectory as Latinos, since both groups share in the immigrant experience, it appears
that they are not as trustful as Latinos. Why this is the case is not entirely clear, but perhaps
generational status does not explain their levels of political trust as well as it does for Latinos.10
Unfortunately, we cannot test this hypothesis with the data from the 2002 Pew survey, as the
generational status question was only asked to Latino respondents in there.11 To confirm that
Latinos are more trusting than other ethnic/racial groups, we estimate a multivariate model using
the 2004 NAES data, where political trust is the dependent variable and explanatory variables
consist of demographic and political indicators.12 Table 3 presents these estimates. These logit
estimates confirm the bivariate distributions; Latinos are more likely to be politically trusting than
Anglos. And consistent with the race and politics literature, we see that Blacks are more likely to
have low trust in government when compared to Anglos. Our multivariate estimates from the 2004
NAES are in line with the patterns of political trust from the NES data and the Pew Hispanic
Center, and thus serve to confirm this basic result.
5.2 The Determinants of Political Trust for Latinos, Whites and Blacks
While these findings confirm that Latinos are more politically trusting than other Americans, it
still does not explain why this is so. The distributions given in Table 1 can once again provide us
with several insights. When we examine levels of political trust by one’s generational status, the
10The percentage of Asians who are foreign-born is somewhat comparable to Latinos. From 1990-2000, 39.5% of
Asians were foreign born, 28.3% from 1980-1989 and 16.2% from 1970-1979.
11Also, because the sample of Asian respondents is so small (N=57), any conclusive statements of trust, by gener-
ational status, would have also been difficult to make had a question about generational status been posed to Asian
respondents.
12We also estimated a similar model on the Pew data, which produced similar results. The reason why we present
the Annenberg results is because it more closely follows Hetherington’s model of the determinants of political trust.
In particular, the Annenberg Survey included several questions pertaining to the economy, while the Pew did not.
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most politically trustful Latinos are those who have most recently arrived, and as we move towards
more distant immigrant arrival, this high level of political trust gradually declines. At the opposite
end of the political trust scale, those responding in the “never” category, a much larger percentage
of fourth generation Latinos are distrustful when compared to earlier generations. Thus, a strong
pattern emerges when we examine Latinos’ rates of political trust by their generational status;
those who have newly arrived in the U.S. tend to hold the highest levels of political trust, but those
Latinos whose families have had a longer presence in the U.S. are more cynical and pessimistic
towards the U.S. government.
Along with generational status, recall that both the classic and segmented assimilation theories
place a strong emphasis on the impact of discrimination on an immigrant’s attitudes towards
government. As such, we need to control for the possible effects of a respondent’s encounters with
discrimination, as well as other predictors of trust like their demographic attributes and generational
status. We use the 2002 Pew Hispanic Survey to estimate the coefficients of this model, since it
includes information on respondents’ experiences with discrimination and their generational status,
while the 2004 NAES data do not. Table 4 presents these estimates and Table 5 provides the
estimated marginal effects from these logit models. Estimating the model separately on Anglo,
Black and Latino respondents makes it possible to compare the effect of the explanatory variables
on the levels of political trust, by a respondent’s ethnic/racial identity. For Latinos, we see that
their financial situation, education level, ethnicity, experiences with discrimination and generational
status help to explain their levels of political trust. As predicted, those who have had the longest
presence in America, fourth-generation Latinos, are less likely to be politically trusting than the
most recent arrivals, first-generation Latinos. A fourth-generation Latino is .06 less likely to be
politically trusting than a first-generation Latino.
[Tables 4 and 5 Go Here]
A Latino’s experience with discrimination also impacts their levels of political trust in the
predicted direction. A Latino with no experience of discrimination is more likely to be politically
trusting, relative to a Latino with some experience of discrimination. Likewise, a Latino who has
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encountered workplace discrimination is less likely to be politically trusting when compared to a
Latino who has never encountered workplace discrimination. Interestingly, the effect of general
discrimination on political trust is slightly greater than the effect of workplace discrimination (.04
versus .03). This may suggest that Latinos who have had any experiences with discrimination may
project these encounters on their views towards the government. Moving on, one’s educational level
also helps to explain their political trust levels; Latinos with no high school degree are more likely
to be politically trusting than college-educated Latinos. Those who are college-educated may be
more cynical and critical of the government, relative to those with less schooling, as a function of
their greater levels of knowledge of U.S. politics.
In terms of sub-group differences, we see that Cubans are more politically trusting than Puerto
Ricans. Considering the large amount of federal assistance provided to Cubans both in the past
and in the present (Garcia 1996) as well as their strong alliance with the Republican Party, it is
understandable why they might have more faith in the federal government than would other Latino
groups. Finally, one’s economic evaluations influences their levels of political trust; a Latino who
considers their financial situation to be the same, rather than worse when compared to a year
ago, is more trusting in government (.03). For those who perceive their financial situation to have
improved, relative to a year ago, are more likely to always trust the government by an even greater
amount (.06). Consistent with the previous work on political trust, one’s economic evaluations, in
this case measured by their pocketbook finances, affects their levels of political trust.
For Anglos, their partisanship, financial situation and gender affect their levels of political
trust. The largest factor driving their trust in government is their party identification; Republicans
are more politically trusting than are Independents. Again, this is consistent with previous research
that finds partisans to be more trusting of the current administration when it is their political
party (Citrin 1974). In this case, those who identify themselves as Republicans, rather than as
Independents, are more trusting of the current Republican administration. Economic evaluations
also explain Anglos’ trust in government. Those who view their financial situation as either better
or the same are more trusting than those who perceive their financial situation to be worse.
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Turning to the estimates for Black respondents, personal finances, workplace discrimination
and certain demographic traits impact their attitudes towards government. Those who are dis-
criminated against in the workplace are less likely to be politically trusting than those with no
experiences of workplace discrimination. Interestingly, while both general and workplace discrim-
ination influenced Latinos’ levels of political trust, only workplace discrimination affected Blacks’
views towards the government. Workplace discrimination also has a bigger impact on the likelihood
of being most trustful for African-Americans (-.05) than it did for Latinos (-.03).
The models examining the determinants of political trust for Anglos, Latinos and Blacks
paint a very distinct picture of the factors influencing these groups’ views and attitudes towards
the government. While demographics play a role for all three ethnic/racial groups, we see that for
Anglos, their partisanship plays a more significant role in influencing their levels of political trust
than for Blacks and Latinos. Discrimination affects both Blacks and Latinos in how they view
the government, but we see that for Latinos, their generational status and ethnic background also
explain their levels of political trust. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis that Latinos,
over time, are more trusting than Blacks and Anglos because of the constant influx of Latino
immigrants, thereby boosting the percentage of the Latino population who are foreign-born.
5.3 Political Trust and Latino Attitudes about Redistribution
The variations in the levels of political trust amongst Americans may also give way to distinctions
in their political behavior and attitudes. In light of Hetherington’s research (2005), we focus on the
impact of political trust on policies that are directly attributable to the federal government. Table 6
presents the logit estimates of the models examining the impact of political trust on individuals’
opinions toward redistributive policies. Of these four policies, a Latino’s trust in government
is important in their attitudes toward school vouchers/tax credits and federally-sponsored health
insurance. Consistent with Hetherington’s findings, high levels of political trust positively influence
a Latino’s support of federally-sponsored policies. The coefficient on the variable that interacts a
Latino respondent with his/her level of political trust is negative and statistically significant (-
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.81); thus a Latino with a high level of political trust is less likely to favor a reduction in health
insurance spending than a non-Latino with a low level of political trust. This result supports our
hypothesis; given that Latinos’ levels of political trust are higher than it is for Anglos and Blacks,
their high trust in government make them more supportive of federally-sponsored initiatives than
non-Latinos. In addition to their high levels of trust, recall that approximately one out of three
Latinos lack health insurance in the U.S.; such a combination makes it understandable why Latinos
would be more supportive of federal spending on health insurance than would non-Latinos.
[Table 6 Goes Here]
Trust in government also determines one’s support for tax credits/vouchers for schools. The
coefficient on the variable that interacts a Latino respondent with their level of political trust is
statistically significant and signed in the expected direction (-.26). Thus, a politically trusting
Latino is less likely to oppose federal efforts at offering school tax credits or vouchers than a less
politically trusting non-Latino. While school vouchers/tax credits are not redistributive policies in
the classic sense, they are directly attributable to the federal government. This result is similar
to Hetherington’s findings on public support for affirmative action, where political trust plays a
critical role in one’s support for a policy which is closely linked to the federal government. Also,
given the caliber of public education available to most Latinos, they may view school vouchers and
tax credits as viable alternatives.
We next calculate first difference estimates to determine the impact of political trust on
Latino’s attitudes towards these two policies. To do so, we use a hypothetical Latino respondent
by setting all variables other than political trust to their mean or mode. We then focus on several
counterfactual scenarios: 1) when the respondent goes from never to sometimes trusting the gov-
ernment; 2) when the respondent goes from never to most of the time trusting the government; 3)
when the respondent goes from never to always trusting the government.
For the first scenario, we estimate the hypothetical respondent’s probability of opposing federal
spending on health insurance/vouchers when he never trusts the government and then calculate the
same probability when he trusts the government some of the time. The second scenario estimates
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the hypothetical respondent’s probability of never trusting the government and then the probability
when he trusts the government most of the time. Finally, the third counterfactual scenario calculates
the probability of never trusting the government to always trustng the government. The difference
between these two probabilities, for each of the scenarios, produce the first difference estimates.
They are presented in Table 7.
[Table 7 Goes Here]
These first difference estimates demonstrate the importance of political trust in a Latino’s
views on school vouchers and government efforts to assist the uninsured. As we expected, more
trust in government leads to greater support for these federally-sponsored policies, though political
trust has a larger impact on a Latino’s attitudes towards school vouchers than it does for federally
sponsored health insurance. For instance, we see that a Latino who goes from never to sometimes
trusting the government decreases his likelihood of opposing federal spending on vouchers by .06.
And when this hypothetical Latino goes from never to most of the time trusting the government,
his probability of opposing federal spending on vouchers drops by .12 . The biggest impact of
political trust on a Latino’s policy views occurs when he shifts from being the least to the most
politically trustful; this reduces his likelihood of opposing government spending on vouchers by .17.
On the policy of federally-assisted health insurance, we see how political trust plays a smaller role
on our hypothetical Latino’s attitudes. Regardless of a change in one’s levels of political trust, its
greatest impact is minimal at .02. Nonetheless, we do find evidence that how trusting a Latino is in
government affects their policy opinions and attitudes. And given that Latinos have greater trust
in government than for the rest of the American population, this may shape the overall distribution
of American public opinion in the years to come.
6 Conclusion
At the onset of this paper, we presented a rather straightforward but perplexing empirical puzzle;
why, over the last three decades, have Latinos been more trusting of government than Anglos or
Blacks? Our answer to this puzzle rests on two factors—patterns of assimilation and immigration
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trends. First, we find strong evidence that a Latino’s generational status plays a significant role in
determining how politically trusting they are; first-generation Latinos are much more trusting of
the federal government than are later-generation Latinos. The reason for this is straightforward;
first-generation immigrants are generally more optimistic and enthusiastic about the economic op-
portunities that await them in their host country. As such, we expect their views and attitudes
towards government to be more positive than those of later-generation immigrants. Classic as-
similation theory also predicts that as immigrants become more acculturated and integrated into
dominant society, their opinions will begin to mirror those of the majority, thereby gaining a more
skeptical and cynical outlook of the federal government.
The second factor relates to immigration trends; according to the U.S. Census, the rate of
Latino immigration has consistently increased from 1970-2000. Since the Latino population is
being continually replenished with a large percentage of foreign-born individuals, Latinos’ overall
levels of political trust may be over-represented by the opinions and attitudes of the foreign-born
population. And while Latinos’ levels of political trust follow the general pattern of Anglos and
Blacks, it is consistently higher over the time period that we focus on. Thus, when these two factors
are combined, we see why Latinos are more politically trusting than Blacks and Anglos.
We also demonstrate the importance of political trust on Latinos’ attitudes towards redistribu-
tive policies. More politically trusting Latinos supported government assistance in providing help
to the uninsured as well as offering school vouchers and tax credits. Thus, the fact that Latinos’
levels of political trust are higher than it is for Anglos and Blacks is non-trivial; political trust is
a significant predictor of Latinos’ policy views, particularly on those which they stand to benefit
from.
These findings also present a number of implications for the future of American public opinion
and policy-making. Given our result that Latinos’ high levels of political trust positively affect their
support for redistributive policies, along with projections that Latinos will comprise 25% of the
U.S. population by 2025, we expect their support for redistributive policies to continue. This has
the potential to change overall public opinion on a policy area that has becoming increasingly less
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popular in the past two decades. A gradual shift in public support towards redistributive policies
may therefore be in place as a result of the changing demographic landscape of the American
population.
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Political Trust Over Time (1964-2002)
Source: NES Data
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Table 2: Opinions on Political Trust: 2004 Elections
Variable White Black Hispanic Asian Other
Political Trust
Trust Government to do What is Right..
Always 1.6 2.5 6.3 2.8 4.6
Most Times 25.8 15.4 26.2 26.5 21.1
Sometime 64.7 66.1 56.8 63.7 59.8
Never 7.9 15.4 7.6 5.1 11.7
N 15,121 1,508 1,432 317 717
Trust in the Honesty of Elected Officials...
Great Deal 3.0 3.0 7.4 10.4 7.4
Fair Amount 45.3 35.9 46.4 44.4 38.6
Not Much 42.6 43.9 35.2 35.7 38.8
None 7.9 15.9 8.8 7.0 11.3
N 7,222 660 619 115 363
Source: 2004 Annenberg National Election Survey. Cell entries are column percent-
ages.
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Table 3: Ordered Logit Estimates: Determinants of High Political Trust
Variable Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
Political and Demographic Variables
Female 0.05∗
(0.02)
Age 0.00
(0.00)
Education 0.00
(0.01)
Blacka -0.08∗
(0.04)
Latinoa 0.26∗∗
(0.04)
Liberal 0.00†
(0.01)
Democrat 0.13∗∗
(0.03)
Republican 0.21∗∗
(0.03)
Economic Indicators
Poor Economic Evaluation -0.25∗∗
(0.02)
Personal Finances Worse -0.10∗∗
(0.01)
Country Going in Right Direction 0.47∗∗
(0.03)
N 13730
Log-likelihood -11321.45
a The omitted category is Anglo respondents.
30
T
ab
le
4:
O
rd
er
ed
L
og
it
E
st
im
at
es
:
D
et
er
m
in
an
ts
of
H
ig
h
P
ol
it
ic
al
T
ru
st
L
at
in
os
A
n
gl
os
B
la
ck
s
V
ar
ia
b
le
C
o
effi
ci
en
t
S
td
.
E
rr
.
C
o
effi
ci
en
t
S
td
.
E
rr
.
C
o
effi
ci
en
t
S
td
.
E
rr
.
P
ol
it
ic
al
/F
in
an
ci
al
D
em
oc
ra
t
0.
04
0.
10
-0
.2
1†
0.
12
0.
15
0.
28
R
ep
ub
lic
an
0.
75
0.
11
0.
56
∗∗
0.
11
0.
94
.6
1
F
in
an
ce
s
B
et
te
r
0.
49
∗∗
0.
12
0.
58
∗∗
0.
13
0.
75
∗
0.
38
F
in
an
ce
s
Sa
m
e
0.
24
∗
0.
11
0.
30
∗∗
0.
12
0.
27
0.
33
D
em
og
ra
p
h
ic
s
W
om
en
0.
13
0.
08
0.
20
∗
0.
09
0.
51
†
0.
27
M
ar
ri
ed
0.
08
0.
09
0.
06
0.
10
-0
.5
2†
0.
27
A
ge
-0
.0
0
0.
00
-0
.0
0
0.
00
0.
01
0.
01
L
ow
-I
nc
om
e
0.
11
0.
12
0.
01
0.
13
0.
21
0.
37
M
ed
iu
m
-I
nc
om
e
0.
14
0.
12
0.
09
0.
12
-0
.0
1
0.
36
N
o
H
S
D
eg
re
e
0.
29
∗
0.
01
1
0.
23
0.
15
-0
.1
1
0.
43
H
S
D
eg
re
e
0.
09
0.
10
-0
.0
1
0.
11
-0
.0
59
0.
04
3
M
ex
ic
an
-0
.0
9
0.
09
–
–
–
–
C
ub
an
0.
69
∗∗
0.
14
–
–
–
A
ss
im
il
at
io
n
M
ea
su
re
s
N
o
D
is
cr
im
in
at
io
n
0.
38
∗∗
0.
09
0.
46
∗∗
0.
12
0.
42
0.
29
W
or
kp
la
ce
D
is
cr
im
in
at
io
n
-0
.2
8∗
∗
0.
12
-0
.0
5
0.
15
-0
.7
4∗
0.
30
Se
co
nd
G
en
er
at
io
n
-0
.0
3
0.
11
–
–
–
–
T
hi
rd
G
en
er
at
io
n
-0
.1
8
0.
15
–
–
–
–
Fo
ur
th
G
en
er
at
io
n
-0
.6
7∗
∗
0.
22
–
–
–
–
N
22
61
17
03
25
5
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
po
lit
ic
al
tr
us
t,
w
hi
ch
is
a
ca
te
go
ri
ca
l
va
ri
ab
le
,
ra
ng
in
g
fr
om
le
as
t
to
m
os
t
tr
us
ti
ng
.
W
hi
le
th
es
e
m
od
el
s
w
er
e
es
ti
m
at
ed
se
pa
ra
te
ly
on
L
at
in
o
an
d
A
ng
lo
re
sp
on
de
nt
s,
w
e
al
so
ra
n
a
po
ol
ed
m
od
el
in
te
ra
ct
in
g
ea
ch
of
th
e
in
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
s
w
it
h
th
e
re
sp
on
de
nt
’s
et
hn
ic
it
y
(A
ng
lo
an
d
L
at
in
o)
.
A
ch
ow
-t
es
t
of
th
is
po
ol
ed
m
od
el
yi
el
de
d
an
F
te
st
st
at
is
ti
c
of
15
.2
5,
w
hi
ch
is
st
at
is
ti
ca
lly
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
a
th
e
p
<
.0
1
le
ve
l.
A
s
su
ch
,
th
es
e
co
effi
ci
en
ts
w
hi
ch
ar
e
es
ti
m
at
ed
on
a
su
bs
et
of
th
e
da
ta
w
ou
ld
pr
od
uc
e
th
e
sa
m
e
co
effi
ci
en
ts
if
th
e
da
ta
w
er
e
po
ol
ed
.
W
e
ra
n
th
e
sa
m
e
m
od
el
on
th
e
20
04
P
ew
Su
rv
ey
,
w
hi
ch
on
ly
sa
m
pl
ed
L
at
in
os
,
an
d
th
e
re
su
lt
s
w
er
e
si
m
ila
r.
31
T
ab
le
5:
M
ar
gi
na
l
E
ffe
ct
s:
L
ik
el
ih
oo
d
of
A
lw
ay
s
T
ru
st
in
g
th
e
G
ov
er
nm
en
t
L
at
in
os
A
n
gl
os
B
la
ck
s
V
ar
ia
b
le
M
ar
gi
n
al
E
ff
ec
t
S
td
.
E
rr
.
M
ar
gi
n
al
E
ff
ec
t
S
td
.
E
rr
.
M
ar
gi
n
al
E
ff
ec
t
S
td
.
E
rr
.
P
ol
it
ic
al
/F
in
an
ci
al
D
em
oc
ra
t
0.
00
0.
01
-0
.0
2†
0.
01
0.
01
0.
02
R
ep
ub
lic
an
0.
10
∗∗
0.
02
0.
06
∗∗
0.
01
0.
10
.0
8
F
in
an
ce
s
B
et
te
r
0.
06
∗∗
0.
02
0.
07
∗∗
0.
02
0.
06
†
0.
04
F
in
an
ce
s
Sa
m
e
0.
03
∗
0.
01
0.
03
∗∗
0.
01
0.
02
0.
02
D
em
og
ra
p
h
ic
s
W
om
en
0.
01
0.
01
0.
02
∗
0.
01
0.
04
†
0.
02
M
ar
ri
ed
0.
01
0.
01
0.
01
0.
01
-0
.0
3†
0.
02
A
ge
-0
.0
0
0.
00
-0
.0
0
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
L
ow
-I
nc
om
e
0.
01
0.
01
0.
00
0.
01
0.
01
0.
03
M
ed
iu
m
-I
nc
om
e
0.
02
0.
01
0.
01
0.
01
-0
.0
0
0.
03
N
o
H
S
D
eg
re
e
0.
03
∗
0.
01
0.
03
0.
02
-0
.0
1
0.
03
H
S
D
eg
re
e
0.
01
0.
01
-0
.0
0
0.
01
-0
.0
3
0.
02
M
ex
ic
an
-0
.0
9
0.
01
–
–
–
–
C
ub
an
0.
10
∗∗
0.
02
–
–
–
A
ss
im
il
at
io
n
M
ea
su
re
s
N
o
D
is
cr
im
in
at
io
n
0.
04
∗∗
0.
01
0.
04
∗∗
0.
01
0.
42
0.
29
W
or
kp
la
ce
D
is
cr
im
in
at
io
n
-0
.0
3∗
∗
0.
01
-0
.0
0
0.
02
-0
.0
5∗
0.
02
Se
co
nd
G
en
er
at
io
n
-0
.0
0
0.
01
–
–
–
–
T
hi
rd
G
en
er
at
io
n
-0
.0
2
0.
02
–
–
–
–
Fo
ur
th
G
en
er
at
io
n
-0
.0
6∗
∗
0.
02
–
–
–
–
N
22
61
17
03
25
5
T
he
ou
tc
om
e
ca
te
go
ry
is
th
e
lik
el
ih
oo
d
of
al
w
ay
s
tr
us
ti
ng
th
e
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
to
do
w
ha
t
it
ri
gh
t.
T
he
m
ar
gi
na
l
eff
ec
ts
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
ba
se
d
on
th
e
es
ti
m
at
es
fr
om
T
ab
le
4.
32
T
ab
le
6:
L
og
it
E
st
im
at
es
:
T
he
Im
pa
ct
of
P
ol
it
ic
al
T
ru
st
on
R
ed
is
tr
ib
ut
iv
e
P
ol
ic
y
O
pi
ni
on
s
O
pp
os
e
O
pp
os
e
Le
ss
Fe
de
ra
l
Sp
en
di
ng
Le
ss
Fe
de
ra
l
Sp
en
di
ng
T
ax
C
re
di
t/
V
ou
ch
er
s
H
el
pi
ng
th
e
P
oo
r
on
P
ub
lic
Sc
ho
ol
s
on
H
ea
lth
In
su
ra
nc
e
E
st
.
C
oe
ff.
S.
E
.
E
st
.
C
oe
ff.
S.
E
.
E
st
.
C
oe
ff.
S.
E
.
E
st
.
C
oe
ff.
S.
E
.
C
on
st
an
t
-2
.8
4*
.1
5
.2
2
.2
1
4.
49
*
.4
4
1.
83
*
.4
8
P
ol
it
ic
al
H
ig
h
P
ol
it
ic
al
T
ru
st
.0
4
.0
3
.0
0
.0
5
-.
61
*
.0
9
.2
3*
*
.1
0
L
at
in
o*
H
ig
h
T
ru
st
-.
26
**
.1
1
-.
08
.1
5
-.
40
.3
6
-.
81
**
.3
5
V
er
y
L
ib
er
al
.3
3*
.0
1
-.
35
*
.0
3
.5
8*
.0
6
.4
8*
.0
6
D
em
oc
ra
t
.2
1*
.0
4
-.
43
*
.0
7
.9
6*
.1
7
.7
7*
.1
9
R
ep
ub
lic
an
-.
25
*
.0
5
.2
7*
.0
6
-.
17
.1
1
-.
22
.1
3
P
oo
r
E
co
no
m
ic
E
va
lu
at
io
n
.3
0*
.0
3
-.
33
**
.0
4
.2
9*
.0
7
.5
1
.0
8
D
em
og
ra
ph
ic
s
E
du
ca
ti
on
.0
2*
*
.0
1
.0
1
.0
1
-.
04
.0
2
.0
2
.0
3
In
co
m
e
.0
5*
.0
1
.1
1
.0
1
-.
08
.0
3
-.
11
.0
3
Fe
m
al
e
-.
11
.0
4
.1
3*
.0
5
-.
57
*
.1
0
-.
58
*
.1
1
A
ge
.0
2
.0
0
.0
1*
.0
0
-.
03
*
.0
0
-.
01
*
.0
0
L
at
in
o
-1
.5
2*
.3
1
-.
30
.4
1
-1
.0
0
.9
9
-1
.8
9*
.8
6
Lo
g-
L
ik
el
ih
oo
d
-9
26
8.
07
-4
76
2.
48
-1
56
8.
72
-1
17
6.
94
N
14
43
3
79
03
74
26
47
05
**
E
st
im
at
e
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
p=
.0
5
le
ve
l,
*E
st
im
at
e
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
p=
.0
1
le
ve
l
D
at
a:
20
04
N
at
io
na
l
A
nn
en
be
rg
E
le
ct
io
n
Su
rv
ey
.
33
T
ab
le
7:
F
ir
st
D
iff
er
en
ce
E
st
im
at
es
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
of
L
at
in
o
G
o
es
fr
om
N
ev
er
T
ru
st
in
g
to
..
O
pp
os
in
g
Fe
de
ra
l
So
m
et
im
es
T
ru
st
in
g
M
os
t
of
th
e
T
im
e
T
ru
st
in
g
A
lw
ay
s
T
ru
st
in
g
Sp
en
di
ng
on
..
.
th
e
G
ov
er
nm
en
t
th
e
G
ov
er
nm
en
t
th
e
G
ov
er
nm
en
t
H
ea
lt
h
In
su
ra
nc
e
-.
01
-.
02
-.
02
(.
00
)
(.
01
)
(.
01
)
Sc
ho
ol
T
ax
C
re
di
ts
/V
ou
ch
er
s
-.
06
-.
12
-.
17
(.
02
)
(.
05
)
(.
06
)
)
E
nt
ri
es
no
t
in
pa
re
nt
he
si
s
ar
e
fir
st
di
ffe
re
nc
e
es
ti
m
at
es
an
d
in
di
ca
te
th
e
lik
el
ih
oo
d
of
op
po
si
ng
on
e
of
th
e
sc
en
ar
io
’s
in
th
e
ro
w
en
tr
ie
s,
ba
se
d
on
th
e
gi
ve
n
co
lu
m
n
sc
en
ar
io
s.
E
nt
ri
es
in
pa
re
nt
he
si
s
ar
e
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
.
T
he
se
es
ti
m
at
es
w
er
e
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
ba
se
d
on
th
e
lo
gi
t
es
ti
m
at
es
fr
om
T
ab
le
s
5.
34
